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1. Introduction1 
The early 1990s were marked by a convergence of views in mainstream macroeconomics. That 
convergence gave raise to the so-called µ1HZ &RQVHQVXV LQ 0DFURHFRQRPLFV¶ 1&0 KHUHDIWHU, 
which conquered the academic word, central banks and other major policy-making institutions 
around the world (Arestis, 2007; Tovar, 2009; Woodford, 2009). The NCM was regarded as DµQHZ
QHRFODVVLFDO V\QWKHVLV¶ LQFRUSRUDWLQJ LPSRUWDQW HOHPHQWV RI both New Keynesian economics and 
Real Business Cycle economics (Goodfriend and King, 1997; Goodfriend, 2004; Dixon, 2008; 
Fontana, 2009b; McCombie and Pike, 2013). In 2000 John Taylor, a leading contributor to the 
development of this new macroeconomics paradigm, listed the most original features of the NCM: 
³First, the long-run real GDP trend, or potential GDP, can be understood using the growth 
model that was first developed by Robert Solow and that has now been extended to make 
µtechnology¶ explicitly endogenous. Second, there is no long run trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment, so that monetary policy affects inflation, but is otherwise neutral with 
respect to real variables in the long run. Third, there is a short run trade-off between inflation 
and unemployment with significant implications for economic fluctuations around the trend 
of potential GDP; the trade-off is due largely to temporarily sticky prices and wages. Fourth, 
expectations of inflation and of future policy decisions are endogenous and quantitatively 
significant. Fifth, monetary policy decisions are best thought of as rules, or reaction functions, 
in which the short-term nominal interest rate (the instrument of policy) is adjusted in reaction 
to economic events´ (Taylor, 2000, p. 90). 
Much has happened between 2000 and today, including a world-wide dramatic financial and 
banking crisis, a consequent devastating recession, and a prolonged stagnation period, which 
continues today. There is now a unanimous consensus in the economic profession that commercial 
banks (banks for short) and financial intermediaries are at heart of these remarkable economic 
events. Therefore, it may seem odd that Taylor (2000) does not mention banks and financial 
intermediaries among the most original features of the NCM. It was not a mistake or oversight of 
the paper. Banks and financial institutions were rarely mentioned, let alone modelled, in the original 
NCM model (e.g. Woodford, 2003; see, also, for a critical analysis, Goodhart, 2010). This is really 
extraordinary vis-à-vis the fact that the NCM model was enthusiastically adopted by most central 
banks and treasuries around the world (see, for example, Adolfson et al., 2007; Smet and Wouters, 
2003 and 2007; Tovar 2009). Yet, some interesting attempts to account for banks and financial 
institutions in mainstream macroeconomics modelling were made in the early 1980s. The so-called 
µILQDQFLDO DFFHOHUDWRU PHFKDQLVP¶ )$0 KHUHDIWHU OLWHUDWXUH SLRQHHUHG E\ %HQ %HUQDQNH
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(Bernanke, 1981, 1983; Bernanke and Gertler 1989) analysed the role of banking and financial 
frictions as triggers or amplifiers of the business cycle. The FAM literature has been rediscovered 
after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. It has been used to amend the NCM model to account for the 
nature and role of banks and financial intermediaries in modern economies (see, among others, 
Christiano et al. 2013, Del Negro et al. 2014). 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a preliminary and critical review of the progress made in 
mainstream macroeconomics in the last two-three decades. Did really the NCM model ignore banks 
and financial intermediaries? Are the core theoretical propositions of the NCM unable to explain 
some important features of real-world economies, and especially the remarkable economic events of 
the last decade? And how the insights and results of the FAM literature have been encompassed into 
the NCM model? What are the prospects, if any, for the new NCM cum FAM model to explain the 
nature and role of banks and financial intermediaries in modern economies? These are some of the 
main questions that this chapter tries to answer. 
  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the three-equation model describing the 
macroeconomic core of the NCM in a closed economy, the so-called benchmark NCM model. It 
highlightV WKH QDWXUH DQG UROH RI WKH µUDWLRQDO H[SHFWDWLRQV K\SRWKHVLV¶ 5(+ KHUHDIWHU, and the 
FRQFHSWRI WKH µQDWXUDOHTXLOLEULXP¶ LQ WKHEHQFKPDUN1&0PRGHO It also proposes an amended 
version of the latter, which takes into account criticisms raised against the use of the REH and NE 
in the NCM. The so-called µaugmented NCM model¶ allows for the possibility of interdependence 
between aggregate demand and aggregate supply, a hallmark of real-word economies captured by 
demand-led Post Keynesian economics models (Setterfield, 2002 and 2010; Fontana, 2009a, 2010; 
Palacio-Vera, 2009), via some hysteresis effects. Section 3 reviews the core features and main 
results of the FAM literature, and presents a simple set of equations describing the µbenchmark 
FAM model¶. It also draws attention to the nature and role of banks and financial intermediaries in 
the latter model. Furthermore, it proposes an augmented NCM cum FAM model (µaugmented FAM 
model¶, for short), which allows for hysteresis effects. A table summarises all models discussed in 
the chapter, namely the benchmark NCM model, the augmented NCM model, the benchmark FAM 
model, and the augmented FAM model. Section 4 assesses the current state of mainstream 
macroeconomics. It reviews many attempts that have been made to amend the NCM model in order 
to fix its failure to explain the remarkable economic events of the last decade. It highlights how the 
absence of banks and financial intermediaries, and systematic errors in inflation forecasting, have 
been accounted for in the new augmented FAM model. It also discusses the inability of the latter to 
allow for the possibility that financial instability is an endogenous by-product of the normal 
functioning of modern economies. Furthermore, it considers the monetary policy implications of the 
augmented FAM model, including the possibility of replacing the dominant price stability goal with 
an alternative financial stability goal, which aims to stabilise the market value of private and public 
financial assets. Finally, Section 5 offers some final remarks. 
 
2. A Critical Analysis of the Benchmark NCM Model 
The macroeconomic core of the NCM can be described through three reduced-form (or aggregate) 
equations, namely an aggregate demand equation, an inflation equation, and an interest rate rule. 
Each macroeconomic equation is in turn strictly microeconomics-founded, i.e. every relationship 
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among aggregate magnitudes is derived from the constrained inter-temporal optimization of an 
individual utility function. This function underpins the behaviour of a single, sovereign, completely 
rational representative agent with perfect foresight, who maximises its utility over an infinite 
horizon by combining labour supply/leisure time and consumption/saving in each period. 
McCombie and Pike (2013 ODEHO WKHVH IHDWXUHV WKH µSDUDGLJPDWLF KHXULVWLFV¶ RU µSVHXGR-
DVVXPSWLRQV¶ of the NCM model (see also McCombie and Negru, 2014, who explore the general 
question of paradigm-dependent economic theories).  
 
In simple algebraic terms, the reduced-form benchmark model can be represented as it follows 
(Clarida et al., 1999; De Grauwe, 2010; see, for a critical assessment of it, Arestis, 2007, 2009; 
Arestis and Sawyer, 2004, 2006, 2008): 
 
(1)     0 1 1 2 1 3 1 1S H       ª º¬ ¼g g gt t t t tY a a Y a E Y a r E    
(2)   1 2 1 3 1 2S S S H    gt t t tbY b b E      
(3)       3 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 31 g Tt t t t t tr c RR E c Y c c rS S S H    ª º       ¬ ¼   
 
where gtY  is the current output gap, tS  is the current inflation rate, TS  is the target inflation rate, tr  
is the current nominal interest rate, *tRR  is the natural or optimal real interest rate,  E   defines 
future expected values, a0, a1, a2, a3, b1, c1, c2 > 0, (b2 + b3) = 1, and 0 < c3 < 1.2 
 
Equation (1) corresponds to the old IS curve, and is grounded on the separation between aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply, with the (growth of) natural output being supply-determined and 
independent of the level, and rate of change, of aggregate demand (Fontana, 2010). It shows that the 
output gap ± i.e. WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHORJDULWKPRIDFWXDORXWSXWDQGLWVµQDWXUDO¶RUSRWHQWLDO
or long-run level ± depends negatively on the expected real interest rate. The output gap depends 
also positively on the past and expected future output gaps. Equation (2) corresponds to the 
µDFFHOHUDWLRQLVW¶ RU H[SHFWDWLRQV-augmented, New Keynesian) Phillips curve, acting as the 
aggregate supply function. It shows that the inflation rate depends positively on the output gap (and 
also on the past inflation and the expected future inflation), signalling demand pressures. For this 
UHDVRQLWLVVRPHWLPHVFDOOHGWKHµLQIODWLRQ-DGMXVWPHQW,$OLQH¶e.g. Romer, 2000; Taylor, 2000). 
Equation (2) can be considered as the equivalent of the NAIRU principle (e.g. Lavoie, 2006, p. 
169): the inflation rate accelerates whenever the actual (growth rate of) demand and output exceeds 
the natural (rate of growth of) output. Equation (3) is the monetary policy rule or the reaction 
function of the central bank. It incorporates the well-NQRZQµ7D\ORUUXOH¶e.g. Taylor, 1993, 1999), 
according to which changes in the nominal interest rate set by the central bank is a positive function 
RIWKHµQDWXUDO¶UHDOLQWHUHVWUDWHWKHH[SHFWHGIXWXUHLQIODWLRQUDWHWKHSDVWRXWSXWJDSDnd the past 
inflation gap (i.e. the deviation of the actual inflation in previous period from its target value). In 
formal terms, it is usually derived IURPWKHPLQLPLVDWLRQRIWKHµORVVIXQFWLRQ¶RIWKHFHQWUDOEDQN
                                                 
2
 7KHYDOXHVRIWKHµGHHSSDUDPHWHUV¶RIWKH1&0DQGUHODWHG'6*(PRGHOVLHWKHSDrameters which are supposed not 
 WREHDIIHFWHGE\SROLF\DUHXVXDOO\REWDLQHGWKURXJKHLWKHUµFDOLEUDWLRQ¶PHWKRGVRUBayesian estimation econometric 
 techniques (Tovar, 2009). 
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where the losses for each period are a weighted average in quadratic terms of the deviation of 
inflation from its target rate, and of current output relative to its potential level (Woodford, 2003, p. 
381). Since prices are supposed to be sticky in the short-run, and changes in expected inflation are 
taken into account, when steering the nominal rate, the central bank is effectively setting the real 
interest rate (Romer, 2000, p. 155).  
 
Two points are worthy to mention here. First, the interest rate policy rule replaces the traditional LM 
curve in the IS-LM-AS model, along with its assumption that the central bank targets the money 
supply. In the NCM the central bank is able to influence the short-run real interest rate, and money 
is a residual (Meyer, 2001). Second, the short-run stickiness of prices also explains the limited 
effectiveness of monetary policy. In the long run prices are flexible, and hence the central bank is 
unable to influence the real interest rate. Therefore, monetary policy affects real variables and 
inflation in the short run, but is neutral in the long run. Finally, notice that combining equation (1) 
with equation (3) gives a negatively sloped relationships between inflation and output gap, which 
represent the aggregate demand function of the model (see, among others, Romer, 2000; Taylor 
2000; Fontana and Setterfield, 2009). 
 
The closure of the model (1)-(3) requires the specification of the nature of expectations, that is, of 
the form of the set of functions E(·). In this regard, NCM authors admit that expected values of 
inflation and output may deviate from actual values in the short run. This discrepancy, in turn, may 
temporarily push the economic system out of its natural equilibrium state (or natural growth path). 
Consequently, there is some room for public intervention in the short run, though mainly through 
the steering of the target interest rate, in order to anchor inflation expectations. By contrast, 
forecasts could not be systematically wrong over time. The rational expectations hypothesis, i.e. the 
assumption that agents know the right economic model and can use all information efficiently, 
remains the first theoretical pillar of the NCM. Exogenous non-systematic shocks may affect the 
HTXLOLEULXPLQWKHORQJUXQLQHTXDWLRQVWRWKLVUDQGRPFRPSRQHQWLVµFDSWXUHG¶E\İi (with i 
= 1, 2, 3). But, apart from this, every systematic economic policy is doomed to leave real 
magnitudes, notably output and employment rate, unchanged. For instance, the only long-run effect 
of a long-lasting expansive fiscal stimulus would be an increase in inflation and (both nominal and 
real) interest rates (Fontana, 2000b, 2009c). This result is the NCM equivalent of the well-known 
neoclassical principle of the long-run neutrality of demand-led macroeconomic policies (Fontana, 
2011). In addition to rational expectations, the other theoretical pillar of the NCM is the notion of a 
natural (or long-run or trend) equilibrium, namely the state towards which a fully competitive 
economy would tend in the long run, when the inflation expectations of agents are utterly fulfilled. 
In the natural equilibrium state, output and employment levels are determined by three factors: (i) 
the quantity of labour-force and capital (i.e. the stock of resources); (ii) the system of preferences of 
individual agents (i.e. the utility function of consumers or households); and (iii) the available 
technology (i.e. the production function of firms).  
 
The mechanics of the NCM model follows from the theoretical pillars discussed above. A departure 
of output from its natural level (or natural growth rate) causes inflation to change, which in turn 
leads the central bank to move the short-run nominal interest rate, and given the stickiness of price, 
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the short-run real interest rate, such that to bring current output back to its normal level.3 This is the 
so-FDOOHG µQRPLQDO-DQFKRU¶ function of monetary policy (Allsopp and Vines, 2000, p. 11). The 
institutional structure of the economy, including prevailing conditions on the labour market, is 
sometimes considered, but the natural or potential level of output is always independent of 
aggregate demand changes, including fiscal and monetary policy led changes. 
 
However, the two theoretical pillars of the NCM modern, namely the rational expectations 
hypothesis and the notion of a natural (or long-run or trend) equilibrium are problematic 
(Hargreaves-Heap, 1980). Real world economies are essentially non-ergodic and path-dependent 
systems (Davidson, 1978; Hanngsen, 2006). Economic variables do not progress steadily toward an 
exogenously-given unique and stable equilibrium. They can reach several (sub-optimal) equilibria, 
and each of the equilibria achieved depends on past values. On the whole, it is not clear how the 
natural equilibrium would be reached in the long run. The achievement of such an optimal position 
is simply postulated. In order to clarify this point, a simplified version of the previous 3-equation 
NCM model is presented below:  
 
(4)   0 1 1 1 1D D S H    t t tY r        
(5)   1 1 1 [ 1] 2nt t t tY YS S E H             
(6)     1 1 2 [ 1] 3T nt t t t t tr RR Y E YS J S S J H  ª º      ¬ ¼     
 
where Į0, Į1, ȕ1, Ȗ1, Ȗ2 > 0. The main difference with the previous model is that equation (4) now 
determines the current value (or growth rate) of output, tY , instead of its gap with the natural level 
(or growth rate), [ ]ntY  (where square brackets show that, in principle, natural output is independent of 
current conditions). In addition, for the sake of simplicity, equations (4) and (5) are assumed not to 
be forward-looking. The variable RR* in equation (6) is the real rate of interest assuring the ex-ante 
matching of savings and investment at the natural level of output. It corresponds to the Wicksellian 
natural rate of interest (Fontana, 2007), and can be derived by substituting equation (4) in equation 
(6). Then, by imposing that the actual inflation rate equals the target rate, and that the output gap is 
nil, it follows: 
 
(7)   0 1/D D   nt tRR Y          
 
If the central bank sets the value of tRR  in accordance with equation (7), then the economy reaches 
its natural equilibrium, and the system (4)-(5)-(6)-(7) behaves like the system (1)-(2)-(3). Yet, the 
assumption that the level (or growth rate) of potential output is an exogenous variable has been 
criticized by several authors. Labour productivity (e.g. the impact of learning by doing of workers, 
                                                 
3
 For a critical assessment of the monetary policy rules in the NCM, see Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2002), and  
Brancaccio and Fontana (2013). See, also Allington and McCombie (2005), for an analysis of the role of stock market 
prices in monetary policy rules. 
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technological innovations and investment in fixed capital) and the availability of labour-force (e.g. 
migration flows) are strictly linked to the current level of demand and output (Setterfield, 2002; 
León-Ledesma and Thirlwall, 2002; Lavoie, 2006; Fontana and Palacio Vera, 2007; McCombie and 
Pike, 2013; Sawyer, 2013). All these factors affect the future potential output of the economy. 
Following Lavoie (2006, p. 182), the reduced-form NCM model (4)-(5)-(6)-(7) should, therefore, be 
amended by introducing an additional equation: 
 
(8)   1 1 1 4n n nt t t tY Y Y YI H             
where 0< 1I d .  
 
Equation (8) means that the short-run level of output affects the long-run potential or natural level 
of output (Lavoie, 2006, p. 181; see also Flaschel, 2000; Fontana, 2010). In other words, equation 
(8) allows for hysteresis effects to be introduced into the benchmark NCM model, in this way 
allowing for the interdependence between the aggregate demand for and the aggregate supply of 
goods and services. For this reason, the reduced-form NCM model (4)-(5)-(6)-(7)-(8) is labelled the 
augmented NCM model in the rest of this chapter. 
 
3. Adding Banks and Financial Intermediaries to the NCM Model  
In the aftermath of the 2007-2008 financial crisis, several scholars argued that the NCM model is 
not fit for modern economies. It does not capture fundamental aspects of the working of financially-
sophisticated capitalist economies, including the possibility of financial turmoil, financial and 
banking crises, and related prolonged recessions (e.g. Foley and Farmer, 2009; Krugman, 2009; 
Buiter, 2009; and Spaventa, 2009). Lucas (2009) seems to agree with this view. He maintains that 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis was not predicted because such events cannot be predicted by NCM 
model (and related DSGE models alike): simulations based on the NCM model are not an 
³assurance that no crisis would occur, but [...] a forecast of what could be expected conditional on a 
crisis not occurring´ (Lucas, 2009). In this regard, one of the main theoretical issues, with 
significant practical consequences (see, for example, Allington et al., 2012), is that the benchmark 
NCM model UHOLHVRQERWKWKHµHIILFLHQWPDUNHWK\SRWKHVLV¶(0+KHUHDIWHUDQGWKH µ0RGLJOLDQL-
0LOOHUWKHRUHP¶0MT hereafter), in the medium to long run at least (Veronese Passarella, 2014). 
According to the EMH, prices of traded assets always reflect all available information, while the 
MMT maintains that, under a number of restrictive assumptions, the value of a firm is unaffected by 
how it is financed. As a result, given enough long time, money and finance would not affect output 
and employment, but only inflation and nominal interest rates. This again is not surprising: if an 
autonomous investment function of firms is ruled out of the model, then conditions of financing of 
investment (and current production) cannot, by definition, influence real variables.  
 
The explicit analysis of the possible interaction between the real economy, and the prevailing 
conditions in the banking and financial sectors is the core feature of WKH µfinancial accelerator 
mechanism¶ (FAM) literature, originally developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist during the 
early 1980s (e.g. Bernanke, 1981, and 1983; Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; see also Bernanke et al., 
1996, and 1999). The FAM literature recognises that firms need external finance in order to realise 
their investment projects. Furthermore, it brings to light the informational asymmetries between 
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lenders (i.e. banks and financial intermediaries) and borrowers (i.e. firms). On this basis, then it 
analyses the process by which negative shocks to the real sector of an economy are amplified by the 
workings of the banking and financial sectors. 
  
The FAM literature introduces several innovative aspects into the mainstream macroeconomics 
debate. First, the informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers make both the EMH 
and the MMT so cherished by NCM authors inapplicable. Second, these informational asymmetries 
mean that lenders have little information about the reliability of borrowers. Lenders face 
conventional agency costs, including monitoring costs and potential bankruptcy risks, which in turn 
translate into a premium for firms of the cost of external finance vis-à-vis internal finance. Third, in 
the face of informational asymmetries banks and financial intermediaries assess the ability of 
repaying loans by using the market value of the net worth of firms, i.e. the collateralized assets of 
firms. 
  
Two important implications follow from these theoretical innovations. First, the net worth, and 
hence the ability to borrow of firms moves pro-cyclically (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). An 
increase in asset prices and cash-flows raises the net worth of firms, and reduce the premium of 
external finance on internal finance. This in turn boosts investment, aggregate demand, and 
economic activity, which have then positive feedbacks on the net worth of firms, and so on. 
Similarly, a fall in assets prices triggers a vicious self-reinforcing cycle. A reduction in the net 
worth of firms leads banks and financial intermediaries to tighten financing conditions. This reduces 
the ability of firms to borrow and finance investment. Economic activity falls, which then further 
reduces assets prices and the net worth of firms, and so on. This is the core of the FAM. An initial 
shock to the economy, however small it is, is likely to be amplified by changes in the balance sheets 
of firms and, more generally, by conditions in the banking and financial sectors. Second, the 
dynamics of the FAM is intrinsically nonlinear, since it depends on both the current level of internal 
finance of firms, and the general conditions of the economy. For instance, the more an economy is 
in a deep recession, the less likely would be the availability of external and internal finance, and 
hence the stronger will be the autoregressive movement in demands (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 
1989, pp. 14-15; Bernanke et al., 1996, pp. 3-4). This, in turn, will produce dramatic effects for 
firms. They will be accumulating excess inventories, while reducing the employment level and/or 
real wages bargained with workers (e.g. Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993, p. 109).   
 
It is worthy to note that references to an exogenously-given natural level or rate of growth of output 
are rare in the FAM literature. On the one hand, it is clearly stated that the methodological starting 
point of the FAM model is the benchmark NCM model. On the other hand, FAM scholars ignore 
long run financial relationships in their works (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, p. 15). In other 
words, price flexibility is no longer regarded as the natural or long-run condition of the system, but 
just as the limiting case ± as Bernanke et al. (1999, p. 6) call it. The long run is regarded as an ideal 
path, rather than as the historical tendency of capitalist economies. But then, if the relationship 
between price stickiness and price flexibility is reversed, with the latter being the exception rather 
than the norm, short-run sub-optimal equilibria become the rule, and so it does public intervention. 
This controversial interpretation of the FAM literature is supported by the repeated reference to the 
debt-deflation theory of Fisher (1933), and also by mention of the work of Minsky and Kalecki (e.g. 
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Bernanke et al., 1999; and Bernanke, 1983, which quotes Minsky, 1977). In fact, the discussion by 
FAM scholars of agency costs resonate WKH0LQVNLDQµREMHFWLYDWLRQ¶RIWKHOHnder risk into interest 
rates, fees and commissions that firms have to pay in order to access external financing (e.g. 
Minsky, 1986). In this regard, another interesting feature of FAM models is the assumed 
heterogeneity of agents. As Bernanke et al. (1996) H[SODLQ WKHVH PRGHOV ³step outside the 
convenient representative-agent paradigm «[since] the distribution of wealth affects the dynamics 
of the economy in a nontrivial way´ (pp. 3-4).  
 
According to FAM scholars, during economic recessions the reallocation of bank lending from 
firms whose net worth is decreasing to more solvent firms trigger DµIOLJKW-to-TXDOLW\¶RUµIOLJKW-to 
VDIHW\¶ SURFHVV 7KLV LQ WXUQ LQFUHDVHV WKH ILQDQFLDO IUDJLOLW\ RI a country. Against this 
background, it is argued that large corporations are likely to be less hit by the greater cost (or 
difficulty) in obtaining credit in downturns compared to small firms. FAM scholars then conclude 
that ³recessions that follow a tightening of monetary policy are perhaps most likely to involve a 
flight to quality, because of the adverse effect of increased interest rates on balance sheets and 
because of monetary tightening may reduce flows of credit through the banking system´ (Bernanke 
et al., 1996, p. 6; see also Bernanke and Blinder, 1988). To put it differently, FAM scholars seem to 
argue that monetary policy affects output and other real magnitudes not so much because prices are 
sticky, as it is assumed in the benchmark NCM model, but rather because it affects the price and 
access to external finance, which has a crucial impact on the investment and production plans of 
firms.  
 
As far as the formal modelling is concerned, the benchmark FAM model is usually obtained 
through a process of microeconomics foundation of the macroeconomic dynamics. This is done by 
considering a production (or investment) technology that involves asymmetric information between 
firms, who have direct access to the technology, and banks and financial intermediaries, who have 
not. In addition, it is assumed that banks and financial intermediaries incur agency costs in order to 
observe the investment returns of firms. These costs are in turn assumed to be a decreasing function 
of the soundness of the balance-sheet of borrowers, i.e. the net wealth of firms. Finally, since the 
latter is likely to move pro-cyclically, agency costs will behave counter-cyclically, therefore 
improving lending conditions in booms and deteriorating them in recessions. In this way, the 
accelerator (macroeconomic) effect of income on investment is brought back to a simple 
(microeconomic) principal-agent problem (Bernanke et al., 1996, p. 27). 
 
The simplest way to include the FAM mechanism within the benchmark NCM model discussed in 
the previous section is to replace equation (1) with the following: 
 
(9)     0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 1g g gt t t t t tY a a Y a E Y a r E a HS H         ª º¬ ¼    
with: 
(10)  1 4gt t tH H YZ H     
       
where tH is the net worth of investing firms, 0 1Z   is the share of aggregate (retained) profits 
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and capital gains in total output (gap), and 4 0D ! is the sensitivity of total output gap to changes in 
the credit-worthiness of firms, through changes in the finance available for investment. The basic 
idea underpinning equations (9) and (10) is that investment, and hence current output, are crucially 
affected by the financial soundness of the consolidated balance-sheet of firms. More precisely, the 
lower (higher) the amount of internal funds accumulated by firms over the previous periods, the 
lower (higher) will be current investment and output. It is worthy to note that changes in internal 
funds can affect production decisions both through the self-financing of investment (direct 
channel), and through the degree of credit-worthiness of firms used by banks and financial 
intermediaries (indirect channel). Whatever the prevalent channel, the result is a strengthening and 
extension of the short-run effects of aggregate demand on output and employment levels. 
Table 1. Four different mainstream macroeconomics models  
 Without finance With finance (accelerator) 
Temporary effect of demand (I) Benchmark NCM (III) Benchmark FAM 
Permanent effect of demand 
(hysteresis) (II) Augmented NCM (IV) Augmented FAM 
Source: Own Construction 
 
Table 1 presents the four different mainstream macroeconomics models discussed in this chapter, 
notably the benchmark NCM model (I), the augmented NCM model (II), the benchmark FAM 
model (III), and the augmented FAM model (IV). Models (I)-(III) have been examined above, while 
model (IV) is a modified version of model (II). It takes into account the cumulative effects on 
investment of changes in the market-value of the net worth of firms, as it occurs in model (III). Yet, 
unlikely model (III), model (IV) does not involve any exogenously-given natural level of output 
towards which the economy is assumed to move. In algebraic terms, it is derived by replacing 
equation (4) of model (II) with Equation (11) below: 
 
(11)   0 1 1 1 2 1 1t t t tY r HD D S D H             
 
where Į2 > 0, while Equation (10) can be rewritten as: 
 
(12)   1 4nt t t tH H Y YZ H     
 
Consequently, the interest rate rule defined by Equation (7) must be replaced by Equation (13) 
below: 
 
(13)   0 2 2 1/nt t tRR Y HD D D     
 
The model determined by the system of equations (11)-(5)-(6)-(13)-(8)-(12) is a synthesis of models 
(II) and (III): like in model (III) changing conditions in the banking and financial sectors amplify 
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real shocks, and can trigger booms and recessions. In addition, like in model (II), long-run levels of 
output and employment are affected via hysteresis effects by the current level of demand. This 
second feature is what distinguishes it from the benchmark FAM model. 
 
Interestingly, FAM scholars acknowledge that the financial accelerator introduces a long-lasting 
(though not ever-lasting) hysteresis effect of aggregate demand into the benchmark NCM model. In 
the absence of information asymmetries ± it is argued ± investment demand can be safely assumed 
to be fixed over time, in the first approximation at least. By contrast, ³when information 
asymmetries are present, investment demand will vary and be history-dependent´ (Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1989, p. 20). This effect has important policy implications, namely that one of main goals 
of central banks should be to strengthen the balance-sheets of economic agents, through the 
stabilization of financial asset (viz. collateral) markets. This policy implication of the FAM is 
explored in great details in the next Section. 
 
4. The Current State of Macroeconomics 
The repeatedly wrong predictions, and especially the failure in providing a satisfactory explanation 
of the 2007-2008 US crisis and the subsequent global financial crisis and economic recession, has 
represented a serious blow for the reputation of the NCM. There have been two main reactions to 
this in the economics discipline. Some scholars have argued that the proclaimed consensus around 
the benchmark NCM model was short-lived and finally unsuccessful (e.g. Buiter, 2009). Other 
scholars have accepted the shortcomings of their original macroeconomics analyses, and tried to 
amend the NCM model. As argued by McCombie and Pike (2013) the analytical core of the NCM 
model is in fact VWLOO³seen by many to be relatively unscathed (but with the imperative to build in 
assumptions that allow for debt default and bankruptcy)´ (p. 521). To be fair, attempts to make the 
benchmark NCM model more realistic were made before the onset of the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis. The most popular way was to modify the benchmark NCM model to allow for the possibility 
that a fraction of households or consumers cannot access financial markets. As these non-Ricardian 
consumers cannot borrow or save to smooth consumption, they follow a simple µrule of thumb¶, 
namely they always spend all current labour income on current consumption. Galì et al. (2004) 
showed WKDW ³if the weight of such rule-of-thumb consumers is large enough, a Taylor-type rule 
must imply a (permanent) change in the nominal interest rate in response to a (permanent) change in 
inflation that is significantly above unity, in order to guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium. 
Hence, the Taylor principle becomes too weak a criterion for stability when the share of rule-of-
thumb consumers is large´ (p. 740). Furthermore, the presence of non-Ricardian consumers is 
proved to affect significantly the reaction of an economy to fiscal policy shocks. For instance, an 
increase (decrease) in government spending entails now a remarkable increase (decrease) in output, 
in the short to medium run at least. This conclusion has been further strengthened by recent work 
indicating that the actual size of the multiplier of government spending is larger than one, either 
when the zero-lower bound on the nominal interest rate binds or the nominal interest rate is constant 
(e.g. Christiano et al., 2009). 
  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, attempts to improve or update the benchmark NCM model 
have multiplied. There have been two main targets of the original benchmark NCM model. First, 
scholars have focused their efforts on systematic errors in inflation forecasting. Second, and related 
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to the previous point, scholars have tried to model financial markets and financial frictions. Starting 
with the former, the overestimation of deflationary effects of the financial crisis in the benchmark 
NCM model has been usually regarded as the consequence of the underestimation of price 
stickiness, which is captured by the so-FDOOHGµ&DOYRSDUDPHWHU¶ in the accelerationist Phillips curve, 
namely Equation (2) above. The underestimation of the degree of price rigidity has, in turn, been 
explained by the lack of financial frictions in the benchmark NCM model. Once these frictions are 
introduced, it is argued that the NCM model accurately predicts the behaviour of the US economy 
since 2008, including the weak drop in inflation rate. Intuitively, the rationale is that financial 
frictions make the Phillips curve µflatter¶, i.e. they reduce the parameter b1 in Equation (2), or the 
parameter ȕ1 in Equation (5), presented above. The US crisis could therefore be interpreted and 
modelled as the result of aggregate demand shocks in the presence of a flat aggregate supply curve 
(e.g. Del Negro et al., 2014, p. 19-21). 
 
As far as the explicit modelling of financial markets and financial frictions is concerned, some 
NCM scholars have explored the effects of volatile risk premia, by assuming that fluctuations in 
these premia are the most important shocks driving the business cycle. This insight closely follows 
the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1999). It represents an attempt of 
developing the benchmark FAM model, where the major difference between old and new models is 
mainly the accuracy of theoretical modelling and econometric techniques. In this regard, a 
fundamental contribution has been provided by Christiano et al. (2013), who assume that firms 
combine internal funds with external funds, namely bank loans, to acquire raw (physical) capital, 
DQGWKDWWKHLQWHUHVWUDWHRQORDQVLQFOXGHVDµSUHPLXP¶Fovering the costs of default of firms. The 
production of goods and services is then likened to a process in which firms convert raw capital into 
HIIHFWLYH FDSLWDO XQGHU µLGLRV\QFUDWLF XQFHUWDLQW\¶ RU µULVN¶ Christiano et al. (2013) show that 
increases in risk premia raise the premium charged by banks, and reduce the supply of loans. In this 
way, they argue that increases in risk premia could account for some key features of the 2007-2008 
financial crisis and related economic recession: 
³With fewer financial resources, entrepreneurs acquire less physical capital. Because 
investment is a key input in the production of capital, it follows that investment falls. With 
this decline in the purchase of goods, output, consumption and employment fall. For the 
reasons stressed in [Bernanke et al. 1999], the net worth of entrepreneurs ± an object that we 
identify with the stock market ± falls too. This occurs because the rental income of 
entrepreneurs falls with the decline in economic activity and because they suffer capital losses 
as the price of capital drops. Finally, the overall decline in economic activity results in a 
decline in the marginal cost of production and thus a decline in inflation. So, according to the 
model the risk shock implies a countercyclical credit spread and procyclical investment, 
consumption, employment, inflation, stock market and credit. These implications of the 
model correspond well to the analogous features of US business cycle data´ (Christiano et al. 
2013, p. 2). 
In short, fluctuations in risk premia over the risk-free interest rate should be regarded as the main 
trigger (or amplifier) of the business cycle. Once this mechanism is introduced in the benchmark 
NCM model, this is shown to accurately reproduce US cyclical fluctuations since the mid-1970s 
(see, also, Gilchrist et al., 2009; Merola, 2013). These results echo early work by Borio et al. (2001) 
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and Borio (2006), which explored the effects of changes in the absolute level of financial risks over 
time. Borio and his colleagues show that, when incentives and potential mismeasurements by 
financial market participants are allowed, the underestimation of risks in booms and the 
overestimation in recessions become a realistic possibility. This has deleterious effects on bank 
provisions and capital ratios. In turn, this strengthens the pro-cyclicality of bank profits, thereby 
encouraging banks to increase lending in booms and to reduce it in recessions. Alternative recent 
ways of modelling of financial markets and financial frictions include the introduction of collateral 
constraints, currency risk premia in open economies, and Minsky-Fisher type of mechanisms (see, 
for useful surveys, Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Roger and Vlcek, 2012). Other models have been 
obtained through the explicit inclusion of a heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive banking 
sector (e.g. Hafstead and Smith, 2012). In summary, all recent attempts to improve or update the 
benchmark NCM model have tried in a way or another to model financial markets and financial 
frictions, and in this way they represent varieties of model (IV) presented in Table 1, namely 
augmented FAM models. 
 
The different augmented FAM models discussed above represent recent attempts by mainstream 
macroeconomists to improve or update the benchmark NCM model. For all interesting properties, 
these models share two problems, namely a theoretical weakness and a policy inconsistent problem 
that seem to hinder further progress in mainstream macroeconomics theory and policy-making. 
Starting with the former, augmented FAM models assume that financial instability and long-lasting 
slumps are the result of exogenous market frictions, i.e. imperfections, asymmetries or rigidities in 
the banking and financial sectors. They never allow for the possibility that financial instability is the 
endogenous by-product of the normal functioning of modern economies. In other words, augmented 
FAM models still assume like in the old benchmark NCM model that in the long run free market 
forces would drive the economy towards a unique exogenously-given and socially-optimal 
equilibrium. It was this hypothesis of a natural equilibrium, coupled with the REH, which had left 
early NCM scholars with no other choice but the adoption of ad-hoc assumptions about the 
stickiness of prices to fit real-world data. As explained by De Grauwe ³[w]hy is it that in a 
ZRUOGZKHUHHYHU\ERG\XQGHUVWDQGVWKHPRGHODQGHDFKRWKHU¶VUDWLRQDOLW\DJHQWVZRXOGQRWZDQW
WR JR LPPHGLDWHO\ WR WKH RSWLPDO SODQ XVLQJ WKH RSWLPDO SULFH" >«@ &DOYR SULFLQJ Ls an ad hoc 
assumption forced unto the model to create enough inertia so that it would fit the data better´ (pp. 
416-17). A similar consideration could be made against modern macroeconomists attempting to 
update the benchmark NCM model by modelling conditions in the banking and financial sectors, 
including the possibility of financial instability, via ad-hoc assumptions about exogenous market 
frictions. This critical stance has in fact led some behavioural economists to explore the effects of 
different heuristics on the financial behaviour of agents (e.g. De Grauwe, 2010), while other 
economists are experimenting with alternative macroeconomic modelling, including WKHµVWRFN-flow 
FRQVLVWHQW¶DSSURDFKRI*RGOH\DQG/DYRLH (2007; see also among others, Dos Santos, 2006; van 
Treeck 2009; Caverzasi and Godin, 2015; Greenwood-Nimmo, 2014; Sawyer and Veronese 
Passarella, 2017; Nikiforos and Zezza, 2017). 
 
Notwithstanding the theoretical weakness of old and new FAM models discussed above, these latter 
models lead to a different rule of central banking vis-à-vis the benchmark NCM model. This is the 
policy inconstant problem. Although seldom pointed out, this policy implication of FAM models 
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should not be underestimated. The point is that once it is admitted that lending is driven by the 
creditworthiness of borrowers, and thereby by the soundness of their balance-sheets, it turns out that 
the stabilization of the market value of financial assets, especially those used as collaterals by firms, 
should be the priority of the central bank. The policy implication of FAM models would also 
highlight another real-world feature of the last couple of decades, namely that the vast majority of 
refinancing operations in the inter-banking market are conducted through REPOs, with government 
bonds acting as collaterals. But, if this is the case, then the support of government bonds, and not 
price stability, should be regarded as the overriding concern of central banks, at least during periods 
of recessions and economic stagnation. Notice that replacing risky private assets with low-risk 
government bonds guaranteed by central banks would further strengthen the soundness of the 
balance-sheets of firms, thereby contributing to smooth the business cycle. This LV WKH µSRUWIROLR
HIIHFW¶SRLQWHG out by Minsky (1986), and recently rediscover by Eggertsson and Krugman (2012, 
p. 1471).  
 
In short, as a result of the 2007-2008 financial and the failure of the NCM benchmark model to 
explain it, let alone to predict it, many attempts have been made to amend mainstream 
macroeconomics. The introduction of volatile risk premia, collateral constrains, currency risk 
premia in open economies, and Minsky-Fisher type of mechanisms are the most innovative 
financial frictions used to improve the long-established NCM model. A several limitation of these 
models is that they never allow for the possibility that financial instability is the endogenous by-
product of the normal functioning of modern economies. Notwithstanding this limitation, the 
introduction of financial frictions in the NCM model highlight the valuable role that central banks 
could play in stabilising the market value of financial assets, especially those used as collaterals by 
firms. 
  
5. Summary and Conclusions 
Early in the 1990s a convergence of view emerged in mainstream macroeconomics. The NCM 
model quickly spread among academics and policy makers alike. The 2007-2008 financial crisis, 
resulting recession, and the current stagnation period, have highlighted a problematic feature of the 
model. Banks and financial intermediaries, which have played a vital role in the start and unfolding 
of these dramatic real-word events, are not mentioned, let alone modelled in the NCM. During the 
last decade, several attempts have been made to improve and update the NCM model by adding to it 
a role for banks and financial intermediaries. This chapter has offered a preliminary and critical 
assessment of these efforts.  
 
The chapter has started with a discussion of the set of three equations describing the benchmark 
NCM model in a closed economy, and has highlighted the role that the REH and the notion of 
µQDWXUDO HTXLOLEULXP¶ play into it. It has also discussed an amended version of the model, the 
augmented NCM model, which allows for the possibility of interdependence between aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply, such that it could capture some prominent features of real-world 
economies. The chapter has also reviewed the original contributions to the FAM made by Bernanke 
and his colleagues in the early 1980s. These contributions have recently been rediscovered by 
scholars aiming to assign a greater role to banks and financial intermediaries in mainstream 
macroeconomics. The original benchmark FAM model together with the recent augmented FAM 
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model have been discussed at great length in order to highlight the nature and role of financial 
instability in these models. The main conclusion of the chapter is that for all good intentions there 
are two still main problems that seems to hinder progress in mainstream macroeconomics theory 
and policy-making. First, the policy implications of the recent theoretical innovations have not been 
fully explored. The augmented FAM suggests replacing price stability with financial stability as the 
main goal of central banks. Second, and more importantly, in the most recent mainstream 
macroeconomics models, financial instability is still modelled as the outcome of exogenous market 
frictions, rather than the endogenous by-product of the normal functioning of modern economies. 
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